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The development of the defense of consent in non-fatal offenses, focusing on the courts' approach to balancing personal autonomy and potential harm. Various cases, including wilson, brown, and others, and examines the recognized exceptions to the criminal law. The document also touches upon the nature of consent, the limitations on the right to private life, and the implications of public policy and public interest considerations.
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“Public policy and public interest considerations will become increasingly important in deciding whether it is appropriate to criminalise consensual activity, giving rise to even greater uncertainty in this area.” [Source 6 Lines 36-38]
Discuss the development of the defence of consent to non-fatal offences by the courts in light of the above statement.
Section AO1 AO2 LTS Introduction Quote as a response to the decision of the CA in Wilson, and its apparent deviance from the HL in Brown, considering also the recognised exceptions to the criminal law. Need to balance personal autonomy and V’s decision to take a harmful course of conduct. Wilson making it clear develops on a case by case basis
Implicit reference l. General Rule
Attorney General’s Reference No. Of 1980 CA Lack of consent a general ingredient of NF offence Ordinarily consent a defence Unless ABH intended or caused. Approved in Brown “transient and trifiling”
Link to MR problems – what if D intends a lesser amount of injury than that which occurs? Slingsby says has to foresee the harm
Very narrow approach.
Low level of harm.
Source 2 l2-
Nature of the consent
Sometimes appears to give consent, but not allowed, either on public policy grounds or to protect V
Tabbassum Richardson Dica/ Konzami Clarence Gillick v West Norfolk AHA Burrell v Harmer Oluboja
Easy to tell apart ‘nature’ and quality’? Artificial distinction?
Obiter in Dica (catholic couple, pregnancy)
Causing wound or harm for “good reason”? l. 15-
Recognised exceptions and limitations Boxing Coney
Sport Bradshaw, Billinghurst, Barnes, Chapman
Sexual Activity Donovan, Slingsby, Brown, Wilson Emmett
Approved of by the majority in Brown, as society still sanctions it. Implied consent to harm within the rules of the game, but the criminal law on top – when is something criminal? Subjective nature of the sport and the level of harm? Benefits outweigh the need to protect V
Need to differentiate between sex with violence, or violence with a sexual motive. Limitations on right to private life under ECHR art 8 – exception on the grounds of public health and morals, but the overtones of the cases, and differences between the cases – can they really be distinguished (Emmett approach was approved in Brown) Also, branding one of the activities in Brown, and the distinction between cases on the basis of the level of harm V was exposed to
s.2 and 7
Tattooing Wilson
Rough and Tumble horseplay Aitken, Jones
Surgery
Implied consent Collins v Wilcock
being higher. The comments on recognised exception all obiter, and are each of them justified on public policy grounds?
Nature of ‘professional’ tattoo and “in principle” (from source)
Seems to be a real exception – inconsistent with the other areas? Also in both cases the consent of V was in real dispute. Why here? No rules or governing bodies as with sport.
Harm solved through it. But consent actually not even necessary most of the time – courts can step in and ‘impose’ consent.
Everyday life. Still limitations on this (see source 2). A practical solution. Applies to those who cannot otherwise give consent as well (e.g. the young)
Reforms 1. Law Commission report in 1995. “intentions or reckless as to serious disabling injury” consent to all less – is this too high – less protection, especially to the vulnerable