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Charitable Trusts: Indefiniteness of Beneficiaries and Broad Discretion in Missouri, Lecture notes of Law

The validity of charitable trusts in Missouri, focusing on the indefiniteness of beneficiaries and the broad discretion granted to trustees. the historical background of charitable trusts, the role of the Elizabethan statute, and the evolution of the law in this area. It also highlights various court cases that have shaped the current legal landscape.

What you will learn

  • What are the essential elements of a valid charitable trust in Missouri?
  • How has the legal attitude towards trusts for general charitable purposes evolved in Missouri?
  • What role does the Elizabethan statute play in the law of charitable trusts in Missouri?
  • What is the difference between a gift to charity generally and a gift to trustees with charitable powers?
  • How does the indefiniteness of beneficiaries impact the validity of a charitable trust?

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MODERN
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS
MODERN
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS
AND
THE
LAW
BY
PAUL
R.
STINSON
Attempts
of
disappointed
heirs
and
collateral
kindred
to over-
throw
gifts
to
charity
have
been,
perhaps
always
will
be,
com-
mon.
The
practitioner
under
whose
direction
the
charitably
inclined
give,
should
bear
in
mind
that
the
instrument
will
probably
be
subjected
to
judicial
scrutiny.
The
usual
grounds
of
attack
are
that
the
trust
is
not
purely charitable,
or
that
as
a
charity
its
declared
purposes
are
so
indefinitely
expressed
as
to
be
unenforceable.
Such
instruments
are
often
assailed
also
up-
on
the
grounds
that
they
violate
the
rule
against
perpetuities,
the
rule
against
accumulations,
or
the
rule
against
restraints
on
alienation of
property.
On
the
other
hand,
donors
have
plans
for
their
gifts
almost
infinite
in
variety;
charitable
needs
are
constantly changing and expanding
with the
advance
of
civilization;
experience
has
taught
that
gifts
to
narrowly
com-
passed
uses
often
encounter
disaster
and disuse;
and
finally
trusts
of
perpetual
duration
are
common
where
the
purpose
is
charitable.
The
ideal
gift
is,
therefore,
one
which
not
only ex-
presses
the
donor's
intent,
but
is
also
flexible
enough
to
accom-
modate
itself,
if
necessary,
to
the
needs
of
future
generations,
and
which
at
the
same
time
is
invulnerable
to
legal
attack.
The law
of
charitable
trusts
is
a
law
unto
itself.
Charity
is
a
favorite
of
equity.
It
has
often
been called
a
ward
of
chancery.
Courts
consider
it
their
duty
to
preserve
them
to
their
sacred
purposes,
and
they
regard
that
duty as
founded
on
principles
of
the
highest
public
policy. Because
of
this, property
devoted
to
charitable
objects
is
exempt
from
many of
the
restrictive
rules
of
law.
Many
other
rules,
applicable
only
to
charity,
have
been
formulated
to
protect
them.
The
distinction
between
charitable
and
private
trusts,
both
in
their
attributes
and
legal
requisites,
is
fundamental.
A
pri-
vate
trust
will
fail
unless
there
are
beneficiaries
specifically
nominated
or
capable
of
ascertainment.
Indefiniteness
of
bene-
ficiaries
is
of
the
essence
of
charitable
trusts,
and
it
has
many
times
been
said
that
charity
begins
where
certainty
of
bene-
ficiaries
ends;
that
if
there
are
beneficiaries
for
whose
particular
pf3
pf4
pf5
pf8
pf9
pfa
pfd

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MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS

MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THE LAW

BY PAUL R. STINSON

Attempts (^) of disappointed heirs and collateral kindred to over- throw gifts to charity have (^) been, perhaps always will be, com- mon. The practitioner (^) under whose direction the charitably inclined (^) give, should bear in mind that the instrument will probably be subjected to judicial (^) scrutiny. The usual grounds of attack (^) are that the trust is not purely charitable, or that as a charity its declared purposes (^) are so indefinitely expressed as to be unenforceable. Such instruments are often assailed also (^) up- on the grounds that (^) they violate the rule against perpetuities, the rule against accumulations, or the rule against restraints on alienation of property. On the other hand, donors have plans for their (^) gifts almost infinite in variety; charitable needs are constantly changing and expanding with (^) the advance of civilization; experience (^) has taught that gifts to narrowly com- passed uses often encounter disaster (^) and disuse; and finally trusts of perpetual duration are common (^) where the purpose is charitable. The ideal (^) gift is, therefore, one which not only ex- presses (^) the donor's intent, but is also flexible enough to accom- modate itself, if necessary, to the needs of future generations, and (^) which at the same time is invulnerable to legal attack.

The law of charitable trusts is a law (^) unto itself. Charity is a favorite of equity. It has (^) often been called a ward of chancery.

Courts consider it their duty to preserve them to their (^) sacred purposes, and (^) they regard that duty as founded on principles of the (^) highest public policy. Because of this, property devoted

to charitable objects is exempt from (^) many of the restrictive

rules of law. Many other rules, applicable only to charity, (^) have been formulated (^) to protect them.

The distinction between charitable and private trusts, (^) both in their attributes and legal requisites, is fundamental. (^) A pri- vate trust will fail (^) unless there are beneficiaries specifically nominated or capable of ascertainment. (^) Indefiniteness of bene-

ficiaries is of the essence of charitable trusts, and it has (^) many

times been said that charity begins where certainty (^) of bene- ficiaries ends; that if there are beneficiaries for (^) whose particular

ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW

use the trust is created, it is not charitable. 1 The public is

the beneficiary of all charity.^2 A^ private^ trust^ is^ invalid^ unless

its declared purposes and objects are clearly defined. 3 Charitable

trusts, however, are sufficiently declared though expressed in^ the

most general terms. The only requisite of certainty is that the

will of the^ giver^ be expressed^ in^ such^ manner^ that^ a^ trustee^ of

ordinary intelligence may understand it,^ and^ a^ court^ of^ equity

may know the^ limits^ of^ his^ powers.

4

The English Common Law of Charities, prior to the Statute of

Elizabeth, and the Statute of Elizabeth itself, are the^ genesis^ of

American charity^ law.^ Missouri^ has^ adopted^ both.5^ In^ Mis-

souri, and it is believed in all states which have adopted the

English Common Law of Charities and the Statute of Elizabeth,

gifts to trustees, invested with a discretion to apply the funds to

any charitable object are valid. 6

In their earlier histories (though the rule has now generally

been modified by statute), New York, Maryland,^ the^ Virginias,

North Carolina and a few other states repudiated the English

Law of Charities, and either repealed or failed to adopt the

Statute of Elizabeth. In^ those^ states,^ even^ the^ nomination^ of^ a

trustee did not validate a charitable gift unless some limitation

was placed on his authority of selection. The theory of these

cases was that a testator had, in effect, attempted to confer on

another the power to make a will^ for^ him,^ and^ that^ unlimited

discretion is tantamount to ownership. On more than one occa-

sion, Missouri courts^ have^ said^ that^ decisions^ from^ those^ states

have little^ or^ no^ influence.^7 Expressions^ in^ certain^ Missouri

1 See argument of Horace^ Binney^ in^ the^ case^ of^ Vidal^ v.^ Girard's Exec'rs. 2 (U. S.^ 1844)^2 How.^ 127. Dickey v. Volker (1928) 321 Mo. 235, 11 S. W. (2d) 278. 3 Jones v. Jones (1909) 223 Mo. 424, 1. c. 450, 123 S. W. 29. 4 Russell v. Allen (1882) 107 U. S. 163 (construing (^) a Missouri trust). 5 Chambers v. St. Louis (1860) 29 Mo. 543; Buchanan v. Kennard (1911) 234 Mo. 117, 136 S. W. 415. 6 Chambers v. St. Louis, supra; Howe v. Wilson (1886) 91 Mo. 45; 3 S. W. 390; Powell v. Hatch (1890) 100 Mo. 592, 14 S. W. 49; Barkley v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mv. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Buckley v. Monck (Mo. 1916) 187 S. W.^ 31;^ Sappington v.^ School^ Fund^ Trustee^ (1894)^123 Mo.^ 32,^27 S. W. 356; Sandusky v. Sandusky (1914) 261 Mo. 351, 168 S.^ W.^ 1150; In re Rahn's Estate (1927) 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120; Harger v. Bar- rett (1928) 319 Mo. 633, 5 S. W. (2d) 1100; St. Louis Union Trust^ Co.^ v. Little (1928) 320 Mo. 1058,^10 S.^ W.^ (2d)^ 47. 7 Chambers v. St. Louis, supra; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, supra.

(^310) ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW

itself. (^) The difference is only in degree, not in (^) principle. In either case, (^) the measure of control of the courts over the (^) trustee

is precisely the same. (^) In either instance, the trustee may violate his duties, and (^) the court may prevent or correct such violation

by restraint, or removal. While the limits (^) of charity are wider than those of any (^) of its divisions or branches, they are never-

theless as clearly defined. American courts (^) of equity are never called on to execute (^) or administer either until a breach has been committed or (^) is threatened. When this happens, the remedy (^) is

exactly the same, and equally efficacious. (^) A trust, therefore, for general charitable purposes (^) is neither too vague nor indefinite

for enforcement. Generality is not vagueness. A study (^) of recent cases discloses that the earlier (^) narrow judi- cial attitude of some courts toward trusts (^) for general charitable purposes, (^) has been relaxed in favor of a more (^) liberal view. There is a reason for this. Evolution has taken place in the art of public giving. Donations to perpetual charitable (^) objects have always been valid.' 0 No (^) man has ever been found wise enough accurately (^) to

forecast the needs of future generations. (^) Many great men who have sought to immortalize themselves (^) with their philanthropies have succeeded (^) only in perpetuating their mistakes. (^) In England

today, some twenty thousand English foundations have ceased to operate (^) because changing conditions have nullified (^) the good in-

tentions of their donors. (^) Julius Rosenwald said:

Millions-soon it will be billions-of (^) dollars are today ly- ing idle because the purposes for which (^) they have been endowed have largely disappeared. In the Bryan (^) Mullanphy will," the testator gave a huge (^) sum of money (^) in trust for the benefit of poor immigrants (^) passing

through St. Louis on their way (^) bona fide to settle in the West. Time (^) has paralyzed this trust's usefulness. Alexander Hamilton

drew the Randall will of the famous Sailor's Snug Harbor case,' 2 whereby the testator's (^) farm was given to be used as a haven

for superannuated sailors. Many years (^) later the cy-pres doc- trine had to be applied (^) to prevent a failure of the gift. Today

20 Russell v. Allen, supra. 3"Chambers (^) v. St. Louis, supra. 12 Inglis (^) v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor (U. S. 1830) (^3) Pet. 99.

MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Fifth Avenue, New York,^ runs^ through^ what^ once^ was^ the^ farm,

and the tract is valued at between thirty^ and^ forty^ million^ dol-

lars. The swollen^ fund^ is^ of^ little^ practical^ value.^ Benjamin

Franklin, in drawing his will, assumed that^ there^ would^ always

be "workmen's apprentices" and made a charitable bequest for

loans to "young married artificers not over the age of twenty-

five." He further provided that the unused interest,^ as^ well^ as

the principal, was to be lent out for one hundred years, at which

time the capital was to be spent for the benefit of the City^ of

Boston for constructing "fortifications,^ bridges,^ aqueducts,^ pub-

lic buildings, pavements, etc." He^ also^ foresaw^ that^ the^ wells

which in his^ day^ supplied^ Philadelphia^ with^ water^ would in

time become polluted, and he^ provided^ a^ fund^ which^ could^ be

used by Philadelphia for piping waters from^ a^ creek^ nearby

into the city. 13 "Poor artificers" and "apprentices" soon^ ceased

as a class. When the accumulated principals of^ the^ funds^ were

ready for distribution Boston^ had^ provided^ herself^ with^ pave-

ments and no longer needed to be fortified; and Philadelphia had

in the meantime provided herself with a water supply. Many

years ago an Englishman who in^ his^ lifetime^ had^ been^ captured

by pirates, left a huge fortune^ for^ the^ ransom^ of^ any^ British

subject suffering the same fate.^ The^ last^ use of^ the^ fund^ was

in 1723, and today pirates are found only on the moving picture

screen. Funds devoted^ to^ specified^ research^ purposes,^ for^ the

ascertainment of^ the^ cause^ and^ the^ cure^ for^ various^ diseases,

such as yellow fever, typhoid,^ etc.,^ became^ useless^ immediately

upon discovery of the cause and the cure. Some years ago a

railroad president gave a huge fortune for^ the^ purpose^ of

providing a home for the widows and orphans of^ railroad^ engi-

neers and firemen killed in railroad accidents. Today the insti-

tution is^ sheltering^ six^ of^ the^ class,^ and^ advertising^ extensively

to get them.^ Instances^ could^ be^ multiplied^ where^ the^ gifts^ of

good-intending but short-sighted donors have^ become^ useless,

purposeless, impossible.^ The^ cy-pres^ power^ of equity^ courts^ has

been invoked innumerable times with varying success^ in^ efforts

to save circumscribed gifts from destruction.

Practical, systematic and scientific methods^ have^ replaced

13Boston v.^ Doyle^ (1903)^^184 Mass.^ 373,^68 N.^ E.^ 851;^ Franklin^ v. Philadelphia (1893) 2 Pa. Dist. Reps. 435.

MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS

A trust without specific beneficiaries named or capable of

ascertainment is valid only if its purposes be purely charitable.

If in such a trust both charitable and non-charitable purposes

are so commingled that some definite portion of the fund is not

devoted to the purely charitable object, the entire trust will

fail.1 It is obvious, therefore, that the trust's purely charitable

character should be made manifest in the instrument cre-

ating it.

There is a wide^ difference^ between^ the^ popular^ and^ the^ legal

meaning of the word "charity." At one time it was supposed

that charities derived their existence from the Statute of Eliza-

beth.", It was developed later, however, that that Act created

no new charities, but only recognized and codified those already

existing under the English Common Law. 16 But it did enumer-

ate and define legal charities, 17 and in Missouri and all states

where it has been adopted, all gifts are charitable which fall

within any of its divisions or within its equity, spirit or

analogy.l

The most famous American definition is that of^ Judge^ Gray

(later Mr. Justice Gray) in Jackson v. Phillips.^19 It has been

adopted and followed in many Missouri opinions. 20 This is the

famous language:

A Zollman, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES, see. 394; Perry ON TRUSTS, (7th ed. 1929) sec. 711; Attorney General v. Soule (1873) 28 Mich. 153. Baptist Association v. Hart (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 1. 1, Vidal v. Girard's Exec'rs., supra. '1The purposes enumerated by the Statute as charitable are "... (^) some for Relief of aged, impotent and poor People, some for Maintenance of sick and maimed Soldiers and Mariners, Schools of Learning, Free Schools, and Scholars in Universities, some for Repair of Bridges, Ports, Havens, Caus- ways, Churches, Sea-Banks and Highways, some for Education and Prefer- ment of Orphans, some for or towards Relief, Stock or Maintenance for Houses of Correction, some for Marriage of poor Maids, some for Sup- portation, Aid and Help of young Tradesmen,^ Handicrafts-men^ and^ Per- sons decayed, and others for Relief or Redemption of Prisoners or Cap- tives, and for Aid or Ease of any poor inhabitants concerning Payments of Fifteens, setting out of Soldiers and other Taxes." 1 Irwin v. Swinney (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 172, aff'd Gossett v. Swinney (C. C. A. 8, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 772; Buchanan v. Kennard, supra. -' (Mass. 1867) 14 Allen 539. 'Crow v. Clay County (1906) 196 Mo. 234, 1. c. 260, 95 S. W. 369; Newton v.^ Newton^ Burial^ Park^ (1930)^^326 Mo.^ 901,^34 S.^ W.^ (2d)^ 118; In re Rahn's Estate, supra; Catron v. Scarritt College (1914) 264 Mo. 713,

ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW

A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under^ the^ influence^ of^ edu- cation or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish them- selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of govern- ment.

2 1

Judge Sherwood's definition in Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science2 2^ has been widely copied in Missouri and other states:

. Any gift not inconsistent with existing laws, which is promotive of science or tends to the education, en- lightenment, benefit or amelioration of the condition of mankind, or the diffusion of useful knowledge, or is for the public convenience, is a charity within the meaning of the authorities cited, and it is none the less a charity because not so denominated in the instrument which evidences the

gift.

In State ex rel. v. Academy of Science,2^3 a non-profit educa- tional institution was held to be operated "for scientific public purposes," and this instructive definition of charity given:

A gift designed to promote the public good by the en- couragement of learning, science and the useful arts, with- out any particular reference to the poor, and any gift for a beneficial public purpose not contrary to any declared policy of the law, is a charity. And, if such a gift is administered according to the intention of the donor, the property is used for charitable purposes (Adams' Eq. 172; American Academy of Arts v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 582, 594).

The most famous English definition (approved in Catron v.

Scarritt Collegiate Institute^2 4 ) is that of Lord Macnaghten given in Pemsel's Case^ :

725-726, 175 S. W. 571; State ex rel. v. Powers (1881) 10 Mo. App. 263,

21 Crow v. Clay County, supra. 22 (1902) 94 Mo. 459, 466-467, 8 S. W. 346, 348. 23 (1883) 13 Mo. App. 213, 216. (^24) Supra, n. 20. 25 (1891) A. C. 531.

ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW

Loose, who died domiciled in Kansas City, Missouri, left the

residuum of his estate, approximating four million dollars to

named trustees and their successors, with authority to apply

the principal and income of the fund "for the furtherance and

development of such charitable, benevolent, hospital, infirmary,

public, educational, scientific, literary, library or research pur-

poses in Kansas City, Missouri, as said trustees shall in their

absolute discretion determine to be in the public interest."

Mr. Loose's surviving collateral kindred filed a bill in Equity

challenging the validity of the trust upon the two grounds that

it was not purely charitable and that as a charity the powers of

the trustees were too broad for validity. Both the District

Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trust and

the Supreme Court of the United States has recently denied

certiorari. In ruling the trust valid it was held that its validity

was to be determined by the law of Missouri; that the gift fell

within the great and accepted definitions of a legal charity, and

that as a charity it met the requisites of certainty prescribed

by Missouri law. The words "benevolent" and "public," plain-

tiffs charged empowered the trustees to devote the fund to other

than charitable purposes.

Following the doctrine first announced in Morice v. Bishop

of Durham,^31 many English decisions have held that donations

for objects of benevolence or liberality may be applied to pur-

poses not charitable in the legal sense. So also under some

English authorities, gifts for "public" purposes have been held

not necessarily charitable. 32 The English view of the word

"benevolent" has had some American following. While Missouri

courts have not directly ruled on the word, they nevertheless

have used it interchangeably with "charitable," as has the Mis-

souri legislature. 33 So also in Missouri and America generally, a

31 (1804) 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 32 Eng. Repr. 656. 3 2 (^) James v. Allen (1817) 3 Mer. 17, 36 Eng. Repr. 7; Williams v. Ker-

shaw (1835) 5 Cl. & Fin. 111, 7 Eng. (^) Repr. 346; In re Jarman's Estate (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 584; In re MacDuff (1896) (^) 2 Ch. 451, Attorney- General v. National Prov. and Union Bank of England (1924) (^) A. C. 262

1. c. 265; (^) Blair v. Duncan (1902) A. C. 31; Houston v. Burns (1918) A. C. 337. 33 Hadley v. (^) Forsee, supra; Society of the Helpers, etc. v. Law (1916) 267 Mo. 667, 675-677, 186 S. W. (^) 718, 725; Turnverein v. Hagerman (1911) 232 Mo. 693, 703-4, (^) 135 S. W. 42; State ex rel. v. Rusk (1911) 236 Mo.

MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS

testamentary trust for "public" purposes is to an unquestioned

charitable use. 34 Other^ and^ better^ reasoned^ English^ cases^ hold that a gift for public purposes is charitable.3 5 Whatever isolated meaning "benevolent" or "public" may

have as descriptive terms in a trust, if they are associated with

"charitable" (^) or other words (^) of undeniable (^) charitable import,

they are accorded the same meaning. 6 By another familiar rule of interpretation, "benevolent" and

"public" will be construed as words of charitable purpose. It

must be accepted that in one of their meanings,^ at^ least, these words in a testamentary gift import charity. Where a^ word

has two meanings, one of which will defeat and the other^ sus-

tain the trust, the courts are bound to give it that construction

which will uphold it. 7

201, 216, 139 S. W. 199; Buckley^ v.^ Monck,^ supra;^ Adams^ v.^ University Hospital (1907) 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453; Estate of Jacob Rahn, supra; R.^ S.^ Mo.^ (1929)^ sec.^ 602. "4 Buchanan v. Kennard, (^) supra; Newton v. Newton Burial Park, supra; Dickey v. Volker, supra; Perin^ v.^ Carey,^ supra;^ Stuart^ v.^ City^ of^ Easton (C. C. A. 3, 1896) 74 F. 854; Russell v. Girard Trust Co. (C. C. E. D. Pa.

  1. 171 F. 161; Girard Trust Co. v. Russell (C. C. A. 3, 1910) 179 F. 446; Todd v. Citizens' Gas Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 855; Vidal v. Girard's Executors, supra. See also State ex rel. v. Trustees of William Jewell College (1911) 234 Mo. 299, 136^ S.^ W.^ 397;^ Halbruegger^ v.^ City^ of St. Louis (1924) 302 Mo. 573; 262 S. W. 379; Jasper County Farm Bureau v. Jasper County (1926) 315 Mo. 560, 286 S. W.^ 381. 35 Attorney General v. Heelis^ (1824)^2 Sim.^ &^ St.^ 67, 57^ Eng.^ Repr.^^270 (followed in Stuart v. City of Easton, supra) ; Dolan v. Macdermot (1867) L. R. 3 Ch. App. 676; Nightingale v. Coulburn (1847) 5 Hare 484, 67 Eng. Repr. 1003; Trustees of the British^ Museum^ v.^ White^ (1826)^2 Sim.^ &^ St. 594, 57 Eng. Repr. 473 (approved^ in^ Lackland^ v.^ Walker^ (1899)^151 Mo. 210, 1. c. 241, 52 S. W. 414, 1. c. 423). 31 Saltonstall v. Sanders (Mass. 1865)^11 Allen^446 (approved in^ Howe v. Wilson, supra); Barkley v. Donnelly (1892) 112 Mo.^ 561,^19 S.^ W.^ 305; Estate of Hinckley (1881) 58 Cal. 457, 1.^ c.^^510 (approved in^ Crow^ v.^ Clay County, supra);^ Tappan's^ Appeal^ (1885)^^52 Conn.^ 412;^ Thorp^ v.^ Lund (1917) 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946; In re^ Huyck^ (1905)^^10 Ont.^ L.^ R. 480; In re Sutton, Stone^ v.^ Attorney-General^ (1885)^28 Ch.^ Div.^ 464; Halbruegger v. City of St. Louis (1924)^302 Mo.^ 573,^ 262 S.^ W.^ 379;^ In^ re Robinson (1911) 203 N. Y. 380, 96 N. E. 925;^ In^ re^ Frash's^ Will^ (1927) 245 N. Y. 174,^^156 N.^ E.^ 656;^ St.^ Paul's^ Church^ v.^ Attorney^ General^ (1895) 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231;^ In^ re^ Bennett,^ Gibson^ v.^ Attorney-General (1875) 1 Ch. Div. 305; In re Salters, Rea v.^ Crozier^ et^ al.^ (1911)^^1 Ir.^ R. 289; Rickerby v.^ Nelson^ (1912)^^1 Ir.^ R.^ 343;^ Hay's Trustees^ v.^ Baillie (1908) Scottish Court of Sessions Cases^ 1224;^ Paterson's^ Trustees^ v. Paterson (1909)^ Scottish^ Court^ of^ Sessions Cases 485;^ Wilson^ v.^ The Lord

MODERN CHARITABLE TRUSTS 319

to separate the legal from the beneficial estate, and both should be created by the use of words of the present tense, such as "I give, devise and bequeath." Of (^) course, the beneficial enjoyment

may be postponed if that be the giver's desire, but the transfer of the estate to the charitable use or purpose should (^) be imme-

diate (^) and present.