3.This article also tells why the monarchic structures / authoritarian order did not change in
the Middle East, like Eva Bellin's article we read the previous week. What are the similar and
different approaches between the two articles?
Both two articles tell us about the structure that do not change in the Middle East. According
to Eva Bellin the lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income
and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture explains the region's failure
to democratize. And she sees the main challenge the state's apparatus.
On the other hand André Bank and others examine the opinions of major IR theorists.
First, “King’s dilemma” take place.It was Samuel Huntington’s notion of the “king’s
dilemma” that emphasized the alleged contradiction between the monarchy as a quintessential
traditional institution and the modernizing challenges that monarchical regimes face.While
the “king’s dilemma” decisively shaped later research on monarchies and led to the “largely
unspoken consensus among political scientists that monarchy is passe ” it can nevertheless
claim only limited explanatory power for developments in the Middle East. While its focus
on the monarchy’s institutional limitations can indeed contribute to the explanation of the
monarchical breakdowns in, for example, Egypt (1952) and Iraq (1958), it still underestimate
other Middle Eastern monarchies’ capacities for policy innovation and institutional
flexibility which – in contrast to the socialist republics in the region – has often allowed
kings, emirs, and sultans to pursue a much less ideological, socially transformative and thus
ultimately delegitimizing agenda.
Also, Geostrategic perspectives examined. Geostrategic perspectives put centre stage the
external military support of global powers like the United States or, historically, United
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union for monarchies in the Middle East. One prominent
explanation relates to foreign and military aid as well as arms sales.With regard to military
aid, it is argued that it “can help fuel [ . . . ] domestic patronage networks” and that arms deals
are a further way to cement the support of foreign powers like the US, especially with regard
to the oil-rich monarchies on the Persian Gulf.At the same time, money from military aid and
arms deals is not sufficient to replace the needed domestic expenditures for funding the
repression or co-optation of the domestic opposition.
