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ETHICS 111 MIDTERM
LESSON 1: UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that argues for the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the usefulness of the actions consequences. This means that pleasure is good and that the goodness of action is determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas together, utilitarianism claims that one’s action and behavior are good in as much as they are directed toward the experience of which refers to the usefulness of the consequences of one’s action and behavior. When we argue that the drug war program of the present government is permissible because doing so results in better public safety, then we are arguing in a utilitarian way. It is utilitarian because we argue that some individual rights can be sacrificed for the sake of the greater happiness of the many. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) are the two foremost utilitarian thinkers. Their system of ethics emphasizes the consequences of actions. This means that the goodness or the badness of an action is based on whether it is useful in contributing to a specific purpose for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is consequentialist. This means that the moral value of actions and decisions is based solely or greatly on the usefulness of their consequences; it is the usefulness of results that determines whether the action or behavior is good or bad. While this is the case, not all consequentialist theories are utilitarian. For Bentham and Mill, utility refers to a way of understanding the results of people’s actions. Specifically, they are interested on whether these actions contribute or not to the total amount of resulting happiness in the world. The utilitarian value pleasure and happiness; this means that the usefulness of actions is based on its promotion of happiness as the experience of pleasure for the greatest number of persons, even at the expense of some individual’s rights. JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832) Jeremy Bentham was born on February 15,1748 in London, England. He was the teacher of James Mill, father of John Stuart Mill. Bentham first wrote about the greatest happiness principle of ethics and was known for a system of penal management called panopticon. He was an advocate of economic freedom, women’s rights, and the separation of church and state, among others. He was also an advocate of animal rights and the abolition of slavery, death penalty, and corporal punishment for children. Bentham denied individual legal rights nor agreed with the natural law. On his death on June 6, 1832, Bentham donated his corpse to the University College London, where his auto-icon is in public display up to this day to serve as his memorial. THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY In the book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy Bentham begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two “sovereign masters”--which he calls pleasure and pain. These “masters” are given to us by nature to help us determine what is good or bad and what ought to be done and not; they fasten our choices to their throne.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. The principle of utility is about our subjection to these sovereign masters: pleasure and pain. On one hand, the principle refers to the motivation of our actions as guided by our avoidance of pain and our desire for pleasure. It is like saying that in our everyday actions, we do what is pleasure as good if, and only if, they produce more happiness than unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience pleasure, but to also inquire whether the things we do make us happier. Having identified the tendency for pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility, Bentham equates happiness with pleasure. Mill supports Bentham’s principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as happiness and, consequently, happiness as pleasure. Mill clarifies that what makes people happy is intended pleasure and what makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The things that produce happiness and pleasure are good; whereas, those that produce unhappiness and pain are bad. Mill explains: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent, this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded--namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Clearly, Mill argues that we act and do things because we find them pleasurable and we avoid doing this because they are painful,. if we find our actions pleasurable, Mill explains, it is because they are inherently pleasurable in themselves or they eventually lead to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham and Mill characterized moral value as utility and understood it as whatever produced happiness or pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The next step is to understand the nature of pleasure and pain to identify a criterion for distinguishing pleasures and to calculate the resultant pleasure or pain; it is in relation to these aforementioned themes that a distinction occurs between Bentham and Mill. What Bentham identified as the natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill refers to as a theory of life. If we consider, for example, what moral agents do and how they assess their
agents, are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasure more than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. For Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for animals, are degrading to us because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for pigs. Human pleasures are qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that we merely pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if there are instances when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. To explain this, Mill recognizes the empirical fact that there are different kinds of pleasures. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than other, it would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider, for example, our experience of excessive eating or exercising Whereas eating the right amount of food can be pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when exercising. If quality of pleasure is sometimes more important than quantity, then it is important to consider the standards whereby differences of pleasures can be judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple. In deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is important to experience both and to discover which one is actually more preferred than the other. There is no other way of determining which of the two pleasures is preferable except by appealing the actual preferences and experiences. What Mill discovers anthropologically is that actual choices of knowledgeable persons point that higher intellectual pleasures are preferable than purely sensual appetites. In defending further, the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial pleasures, Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person would prefer to accept the highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same time being denied of everything that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up human qualities of higher reason for the pleasures of a pig. In the most famous quite in Mill’s Utilitarianism, we read: It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion. It is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. While it is difficult to understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures with human ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Simply but, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs and humans, but it is difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our way of life. The pleasures of an
IIonggo eating chicken inasal and an Igorot eating pinikpikan is an example. This cannot be done by simply tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In the same way, some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the music of Eraserheads than that of the APO Hiking Society. PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent alone and independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures, regardless of how high, intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also about the pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions. Mill explains: I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly just conception of utility or happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier and that the world in general is immediately a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutations superfluous. Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor happiness alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied by our actions, it does not constitute a moral good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive of sacrifices that procure more happiness for others. Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider everyone’s happiness, including our own, as the standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that utilitarianism is not at all separate from liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all persons. Utilitarianism is interested with everyone’s happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using technology, and other practical ways as example of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of pleasure over displeasure over displeasure for the greatest number. Because of the premium given to the consequences of actions, Mill pushes for the moral irrelevance of motive in evaluating actions: He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trust him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons
there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification.; from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most vital of all interests. In this context, our participation in government and social interactions can be explained by the principle of utility and be clarified by Mill’s consequentialism. Mill further associates utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights. We are treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected by law. Mill undertands that legal rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are subject to some exceptions: It is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is of several exceptions, arising from the other forms in which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves. For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may have forfeited the rights which he is so deprived of a case to which we shall return presently. Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness principle, then these rights need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like saying that there are instances when the law is not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable. The legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights which ought not to have belonged to him; in other words, the law which confers on him these rights may be a bad law. When it is so, or when it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should only be shown in endeavoring to get it altered by competent authority. This opinion is defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of expediency; principally on that of the importance, to common interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law. When, however, a law i9s thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded; as being so in the same ways in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody’s right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case on injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right. Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not follow, even violate, an unjust law. The implication is that those protest over political policies of a morally objectionable government act in a morally obligatory way. While this is not always preferred. Mill thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience for the sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and legal rights, Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights.
While it can be justified why others violate legal rights. It is an act of injustice to violate an individual’s moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness. Going back to the case of wiretapping. It seems that one’s right to privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This means that moral right6s are only justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in this way: All person are deemed to have a rights to equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social Inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but if injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated’ forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at least learn to condemn. In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and the like. We say “theoretically” because this merely constitutes a thought experiment and need not be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the resultant happiness. Then anything may be justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness of the greatness number of people. Thus, to save a life, it may not be only allowable, but a duty to steal or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity maintaining that there can be laudable injustice. While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals to the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness principle. There is no right to violate where utility is not served by the social protection of individual interests. While he recognizes how ,utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that would regularly be understood as disregarding individual rights argues that this is only possible if it is judged to produce more happiness than unhappiness. In short, Mill’s moral rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but are only justified by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest number. With these understanding of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of justice and it is with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms of moral rights because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains: The idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
might claim that it is okay for him to have more than one sexual partner, since, in a pride of lions, the alpha male gets to mate with all the she-lions. In yet other instances, the world “natural” is used as an appeal to something instinctual without it being directed by reason. For example, a man may deem it all right if he were to urinate just anywhere because after all he sees it as “natural” function of humans. Lastly, we also easily find people using the word “natural” to refer to what seems common to them given their particular environment. For instance, a Filipina may suppose that eating three full meals of rice and ulam every day is what is “natural” because everyone she knows behaves in that way. Given these varied meanings of the term: natural”, we need to find a more solid and nuanced way to understand the term. In this chapter, we will explore how Thomas Aquinas provides this, emphasizing the capacity for reason as what is essential in our human nature. This understanding of human nature anchored on our capacity for reason will become the basis of the natural law theory, a theory which will provide us a unique way of determining the moral status of our actions. What is natural law? ‘Natural’ because the goals and the major values human beings seek are innate, that is, they are from the nature and are not selected freely by individual persons or communities. Since human nature does not change, the basic goals are constant and basic morality does not change. It is considered ‘law’ because by reasoning about the innate goals and values we can determine actions, which is oftentimes expressed in norms or laws that enables the person to achieve their goals. Natural Law is a system in which actions are seen as morally or ethically correct if it accords with the end purpose of human nature and human goals. Natural Law follows the fundamental maxim, ‘do good and avoid evil’. A follower of natural law contends that God is the creator. They believed that God’s law is reflected in nature and in His creation. So by following man’s heart therefore they can recognized the law of God. The natural law method of seeking moral norms and evaluating human acts has a long history in the catholic community. On the other hand, it is closely associated to St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas begins his natural law theory by differentiating human acts from acts of man. Human acts as Aquinas expressed proceeds from the will and the act of man is an action that does not proceeds from the will. It is only the human act that is being determined as moral or immoral because its origin is the exercise of the will. The morality of the human act depends primarily on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will (John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor , 1993). The moral object can be described as the intention inherent in the action that one is actually performing, the moral object specifies the human act and is the purpose that the act accomplishes as a means to the ultimate goal of life. For example, ‘If I gave money to the poor, I am
performing an act of charity, a human act judged by its moral object or the intention inherent in the act. Although the moral object or finis operis is the fundamental element of the morality of the human act, there is also the circumstance. Circumstance is a part of the human act that must be considered in order to evaluate the total moral act (Summa Theologica, 1947, I-II, q. 18, a. 3). Circumstance can be considered in various moral questions, thus, we might ask, ‘who’, ‘when’, ‘how much’ or ‘in what manner’. Example, a physician who injects a debilitated patient with a fate dose drugs to end his suffering. The moral object of the act (what actually the physician intends to do) is to kill the patient and it is this intention that makes the physical act of the injection a moral evil. The circumstance of the physician’s act, e.g., time, place, and condition of the patient cannot make this act good. Finally, the ultimate reason that determines the moral act is the intention. Intention/motive is a means towards the attainment of true happiness both of the agent and the common good. Thus, in the example, killing an innocent person to help relieve pain cannot be justified. That is why as Ashley and O’Rouke said, ‘we may not do evil for good to come out of it’ (Originally is taken from Rom. 3:8, Ashley, OP and O’Rouke OP, 2001). The presentation at hand speaks about the norms of moral act, however, if given a situation or alternative wherein there is the conflicting issues as to what course of action will prevail, Aquinas designed a method known as ‘Principle of Double-Effect’. This principle is used in order to judge the moral acceptability of the human act that has two effects, one is good and the other is evil. Traditional Moral theology, presents four conditions for the double effect principle to be applied:
- The action is good in itself or at least indifferent.
- The good effect must come first before the evil effect or a least simultaneously.
- The good effect must be intended.
- There must be a proportionately grave reason for the evil effect to happen. The application of the principle of double effect emphasized that the good effect is really and honestly the one that is intended, instead of the evil one. For example, a nurse is treating pneumonia to a patient with terminal cancer. In prescribing medication, one may possibly claim that his/her intention is to treat the pneumonia but it is possible as well that in one’s mind it would also be good so that death could be hastened and the patient would not be in pain and prolonged suffering for a longer period of time. In this example, it is required that the purity of ones internal action of consent or intention must be intended. Situations by which the principle of double-effect can be seen and applied and is not limited to it: pain, restlessness, delirious, uncontrolled seizures and depression
Being told that one should heed one’s conscience or that one should try to be virtuous, does very little to guide people as to what specifically should be done in a given situation. Thus, there is a need for clearer basis of ethics, a ground that will more concretely direct our sense of what is right and wrong. For Aquinas, this would be the natural law. We can recall how ethical approach called the divine command theory urges a person toward unthinking obedience to religious precepts. Given the problems of this simplistic approach to ethics, we can contrast how the moral theory of Aquinas requires the judicious use of reason. In doing so, one’s sense of right and wrong would be grounded on something stable: human nature itself. We will start by exploring how Aquinas restates the Christian message, making use of a philosophical vocabulary appropriated from the ancient Greeks. We then look at how Aquinas speaks of the essence and also the varieties of law. From there, we will able to explore the precepts of the natural law. THE ESSENCE AND VARIETIES OF LAW ESSENCE As rational beings, we have free will. Through our capacity for reason, we are able to judge between possibilities and to choose to direct our actions in one way or the other. Our actions are directed toward attaining ends or goods that we desire. We work on a project to complete it. We study in order to learn. My mother bakes in order to come up with some cookies. Maybe my brother practices playing his guitar in order to get better at it. It can also be as the fact that I play basketball because I enjoy doing so. These are goods, and we act in a certain way to pursue them, so goods are sometimes referred to as the ends of actions. There are many possible desirable ends or goods, and we act in such ways to pursue them. However, just because we think that a certain end is good and is therefore desirable does not necessarily mean it is indeed good. It is possible to first suppose that something is good only to realize later that doing so was a mistake. This is why it is important for reason to always be part of the process. Acts are rightly directed toward their ends by reason. But this does not simply mean that through reason we can figure out how to pursue something that we already had thoughtlessly supposed to be good for us; what is necessary is to think carefully of what really is in fact food for us. In thinking about what is good for us, it is also quite possible that we end up thinking exclusively of our own good. Aquinas reminds us that this will not do; we cannot simply
act in pursuit of our own ends or good without any regard for other people’s ends or good. We are not isolated beings, but beings who belong to a community. Since we belong to a community, we have to consider what is good for the community as well as our own good. This can be called the common good. What exactly the common good is might not always be easy to determine as there are many variables to consider, such as the particular community we are thinking of or the particular ends that the community is pursuing. But that need not occupy us right now. What is of greater significance for us here is the recognition that, since we must consider not have to be some kind of measure to our acts. It is good for us to not simply be free to act in whatever way we like. We should recognize the proper measure or the limits in our actions that would allow us to direct our acts in such a way that we can pursue ends, bout our own and also that of others, together. The determination of the proper measure of our acts can be referred to as law. Using a simple example, we can think of traffic rules. A motorist cannot just drive in any way he likes, but must respect traffic rules. These rules seem to measure or place a limit on his driving, for example, by placing a maximum speed he can travel on a particular road. Such a limit or such a rule is something good, both him and for others as it helps prevent motor accidents. As Aquinas puts it, the law must regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. A law, therefore, is concerned with the common good. In a way, making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public person who has care for the common good or is tasked with the concern for the good of the community or of the whole people. Consider some of these example. On a modest scale, imagine a student organization of twenty members. Together, all the members decide that it would be best if they were to meet on Friday afternoons or that they all had to contribute for lunch in their meetings. On a larger scale, a teacher who is in charge of a class of forty students has to put some rules in just walk in and out of the classroom and that they are not supposed to chatter loudly with their seatmates. The teacher imposes these rules not on a whim, but for the good of the class. On a still larger scale, city officials put up ordinances concerning, for example garbage collection, traffic schemes, or zoning to control building sites. Ideally speaking, these all are done in view of what would be best for the community. It is also necessary for rules or laws to be communicated to the people involved in order to enforce them and to better ensure compliance. This is referred to as promulgation , In an ideal sense, without considering the reality that sometimes rules are not properly thought out or seem to favor select persons or groups rather than the common good, we
On the other hand, human being’s participation is different. The human being, as rational, participates more fully and perfectly in the law given the capacity for reason. The unique imprint upon us, upon our human nature by God, is the capacity to think about what is good and what is evil, and to choose and direct ourselves appropriately. So Aquinas writes: ”Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Therefore, by looking at our human nature, at the natural inclinations given to us by God, we can determine the rule and measure that should be directing our acts. These are the precepts of the natural law, which we will study more closely in the next section. However, let us mention first two more kinds of law provided by Aquinas. Aquinas points out that while reflecting on our human nature will provide us the precepts of the natural law, these are quite general and would have to be made more specific, and at the same time more concrete in the actual operation of human acts, For this reason, there is also human law. Human law refers to all instances wherein human beings construct and enforce laws in there communities. Given the larger picture of Aquinas’s view, one would have a basis for assessing the validity or invalidity of a human law: whether or not it conforms to the natural law. Insofar as a human law goes against what nature inclines us toward, it is not properly speaking a law -- in the ideal sense of directing us to the common good -- but instead is unjust and can be called a matter of violence. Finally, Aquinas asks us to recall that there is a certain form of happiness that is proportionate to our human nature, which we can obtain by means of our natural principles. However, there also is another more complete, happiness that surpasses human’s nature, a supernatural that can be obtained through the power of God alone. To direct us towards our supernatural end, we had been given further instructions in the form of divine law. This term, often confused with eternal law, refers specifically to the instances where we have precepts or instructions that come from divine revelation. For example, we have what is handed down to us in sacred Scripture. While this is necessary for Aquinas as he sees our end as the blessed return to God, it is not our concern here insofar as, given that our concern is ethics, one need not rely on the divine law in order to be moral. Of interest then about this natural law theory of Aquinas is that while it is clearly rooted in a Christian vision, it grounds a sense of morality not on that faith but on human nature. Aquinas writes:” So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law.
The statement is a remarkable claim: anyone, coming from any religious tradition, just by looking at the nature that she shares with her fellow human beings, would be able to determine what is ethical. The complication one may have over an overtly religious presentation is dispelled when we recognize the universal scope that Aquinas envisions. NATURAL LAW We may now turn to the specifics concerning the natural law. IN COMMON IN OTHER BEINGS In reading Aquinas, we have to consider how we, human beings , are both unique and at the same time participating in the community of the rest of creation. Our presence in the rest of creation does not only mean that we interact with creatures that are not human, but that there is also in our nature something that shares in the nature of other beings. Aquinas thus identifies first that there is in our nature,common with all other beings, a desire to preserve one’s own being. A makahiya leaf folds inward and protects itself when touched. A cat cowers and then tries to run away when it feels threatened. Similarly, human beings have that natural inclination to preserve human life. We can thus say that it would be a violation of the natural law, and therefore unethical to take the life of another. Murder, for instance, would be a clear example of a violation of the natural law. On a more controversial note, it seems that taking one’s own life would be unacceptable, even in the form of physician-assisted suicide. On a more positive note, we can confidently posit that acts that promote the continuation of life are to be lauded as ethical because they are in line with the natural law. IN COMMON WITH OTHER ANIMALS Aquinas then goes on to say that there is our human nature, common with other animals, a desire that has to do with sexual intercourse and the care of one’s offspring. As a matter of fact, animals periodically engage in sexual intercourse at a specific time of “heat”, and this could result an offspring. In human beings, too, that natural inclination to engage in the sexual act and to reproduce exists. The intrinsic connection between the sexual act and fecundity gives rise to a number of notions of what is acceptable and unacceptable in varying degrees of contentiousness. An ethical issue that is hotly contested in some parts of the world is whether abortion is acceptable. From the stance of the natural law, the act of preventing the emergence of new life would be considered unacceptable. Not so controversial, perhaps, would be the claims that we could more easily make about how it is good to
intellectual directing and commanding our sensitive and nutritive capacities.^30 What this amount to is the need to recognize that while our other inclinations are good, as they are in our nature, what it means to be human is, precisely to exercise our reason in our consideration of how the whole self should be comported toward the good. I cannot simply say, “Sex is natural”, if what I mean by that is that I could just engage in the act in any way I like without thought or care. Instead, we are enjoined to make full use of our reason and determine when the performance of our natural inclinations is appropriate. Second, recognizing how being rational is what is proper to man,^31 the apparent vagueness of the third inclination that Aquinas mentions is counter-balanced by the recognition that he is not interested in providing precepts that one would simply, unthinkingly, follow. To say that the human being is rational is to recognize that we should take up the burden of thinking carefully how a particular act may or may not be a violation of our nature. It is to take the trouble to think carefully about our acts would either contribute to, or detract from, the common good. For this reason, in making human laws, additions that are not at all problematic for the natural law are possible. At first glance, it may seem like there is nothing “natural” about obeying traffic rules or paying taxes. However, if it has been decided that these contribute to the common good, then they could, in fact, be proper extensions of the natural law. As Aquinas puts it, nothing hinders a change in the natural law by way of addition,^32 since our reason has found and can find many things that benefit individual and communal human life.
LESSON 3: DEONTOLOGY
During the flag ceremony of that Monday morning, January 24, 2017, the mayor of Baguio City awarded a certificate from the City Government that commended Reggie cabututan for his “extraordinary show of honesty in the performance of their duties or practice of profession.” Reggie is a taxi driver who, just three days before the awarding, drove his passenger, an Australian named Trent Shields, to his workplace. The foreigner, having little sleep and was ill the previous day, left his suitcase inside the taxi cab after he reached his destination. The suitcase contained a laptop, passport, and an expensive pair of headphones, which Trent claimed amounted to around 260,000pesos. Consider closely the moment when Reggie found that Trent had left a suitcase in his taxi cab: If he were to return the suitcase, there was no promise of an award from the City Government of Baguio and no promise of a reward from the owner. What if he took the suitcase and sold its contents? That could surely help him supplement his daily wages. Life as a taxi driver in the Philippines is not easy. A little extra cash would go a long way to put food in the table and to pay tuition fees for his children.
Yet, Reggie returned the suitcase without the promise of a reward. Why? Perhaps, he had previously returned lost luggage to passengers. Maybe, it was his first time to do so. Maybe, he received a reward before, or maybe he knows some fellow taxi drivers who did or did not receive rewards from passengers after they returned lost luggage. However, the point is that there was no promise of a reward. A reward, in the first place, is not an entitlement. It is freely given as an unrequired gift for one’s service or effort. Otherwise, it would be a payment, not a reward, if someone demanded it. Why did Reggie return the suitcase? For now, let us suppose his main reason was simply because it was right to return lost property to the rightful owner, no matter how tempting. It is to keep it for oneself. Is it possible that Reggie’s reason for returning the luggage was not because of any reward whether psychic or physical? “it is simply the right thing to do, “ Reggie might have told himself. What if Reggie did not return the suitcase, destroyed the lock, then took and sold its valuable contents? What is wrong about keeping and benefiting from the valuables that someone misplaced? “It is his fault; he was mindless and careless,” Reggie could have thought. As the saying goes: Finders keepers, losers, weepers. On one hand, Reggie could have mused: “He will learn to be more mindful of his things from now on. “Yet, Reggie returned the suitcase without the promise of reward. As we previously said, perhaps, Reggie believed that it was the right thing to do. Even if he felt that he could have benefited from the sale of the valuable items in the suitcase, he must have believed the principle that it is right to do the right thing. Reggie could be holding on to this moral conviction as a principle of action. To hold a moral conviction means believing that it is one’s duty to do the right thing. What is duty? Why does one choose to follow her duty even if doing otherwise may bring her more benefits? DUTY AND AGENCY The moral theory that evaluates actions that are done because of duty is called deontology. Deontology comes from the Greek word “deon”, which means ‘being necessary” Hence, deontology refers to the study and obligation. The main proponent of deontology is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He was a German Enlightenment philosopher who wrote one of the most important works on moral philosophy, Groundwork towards a human beings, have the faculty called rational will, which is the capacity to act according to principles that we determine for ourselves. To consider the rational will is to point out the difference between animals and persons. On one hand, animals are sentient organisms. Sentience, meaning an organism has the ability to perceive and navigate its external environment. Insofar as
